The Middle East: A Tangled Web of History and Diplomacy

Welcome back to what's going on with Earl Ingram. We'd like to thank our sponsor, the ACLU, for doing this great service by allowing us the opportunity to keep coming before you. And I am excited, as always, to bring back my good friend and confidant.

Mr. Sandy Williams, hey Sandy, how you doing, man? Yeah, that's the part we don't talk about, right? You know Sandy, a little levity before we get into what is a serious, serious discussion. As we watch the just total confusion,

that is happening right now with what's going on with the United States Israel and Iran and all the other Ancillary Nate nations that are involved in what is a very serious entanglement That there's some backdrop to why

this is taking place that we're not hearing. And so I ask you if we could spend some time talking this morning about that backdrop, because it's really at the root of most cities, wouldn't you say? Well, yeah, we have a long history with both countries. And if you go back to World War II and sort of bring that up to the present,

We've sort of evolved and backed into this cactus that is the current situation. But it hasn't always been like this. And if you look at the history, you can immediately realize that it wouldn't have to be like this either if people had made different choices at different times. So when you talk about people making different choices at different times, clearly our relationship with Israel is ironclad.

And well, it appears to be ironclad because nobody wants to book Israel. That's why, you know, if you go back to in our history with Israel, I mean, Israel is, as a country dates back to 1948 and the United States and Britain were the first countries to recognize it as a country. But when we recognized it, we left Israel to its own devices because it immediately got into and there was an Arab-Israeli war.

which had resulted in the recognition of Israel, but it didn't really end at that point. And we stood back and basically took a neutral posture, relying on the UN and others to try to resolve peace. And some of the boundary issues associated with what was Israel and the early issues that Israel had with its neighbors, we basically stayed out of. And, in fact,

By the mid-1950s, when Israel was about eight years old, Israel, along with England and France, had hatched a strategy to try and take the Suez Canal, take control of the Suez Canal. It was an interesting kind of a plot, but it was not a very secret one. Israel invaded the Egyptian…

territory. And at the same time, England and France then went in to try to protect, they said, the Suez Canal from this conflict between Egypt and Israel. And they tried to get Egypt to give up control of the Suez Canal. This was all precipitated by Ganel Abdel Nasser taking control of the Suez Canal.

And the United States almost immediately, when France and England, as well as Israel, were now threatening war with Egypt, the United States stepped in, backed Egypt, basically backed France and England down, and required that Israel stand down as well. And so, you know, we were capable of opposing Israel in the mid-50s.

And then during the 60s, we ended up with situations in Israel that in which we basically were providing Israel with support of sorts.

But we took no direct intervention in their six-day war or their so-called war of attrition during the 60s. And Israel obviously handled itself quite well in both circumstances. And they ended up actually taking territory from their opponents. They ended up taking territory from Jordan, which resulted in the West Bank. They took territory at the Golan Heights. And so the map of Israel became

considerably geographically larger during this period in the 60s, during a period when we did not intervene at all, and we basically backed after they took this land, the United Nations had a UN Resolution 242, which was essentially the notion that Israel would use this land they had taken.

to barter for peace with their neighbors at a later date, so it was basically called the Land for Peace Plan, and Israel was allowed to continue to control this land they had taken with the notion that they would not permanently settle it, and it would be available to be returned at some point in the future in the context of a massive settlement.

Then, in the 70s, we had the Yom Kippur War, in which Israel did struggle some. It was a lengthier process. And we ended up there, ultimately, with the Camp David Accords, which began to develop a formula for peace with the neighbors for Israel. But by the 80s,

Israel had gotten into a direct war with Lebanon, and that was all about Israel's security concerns.

We backed Israel in the beginning of that war because of the security concerns associated with their conflicts with terrorists in Lebanon. But then we began to have second thoughts as Israel invaded Lebanon, and it became a real potential land war, at which point the United States deployed troops to Lebanon and took a peacekeeping role, saying that we would essentially

have troops in Lebanon, to hold Lebanon at bay, but Israel was to back off. And also, at this point, we began to engage with discussions with the Palestinians. The Palestinian situation in Israel had reached

a more difficult stage. And we had the first Antifada, which was the result in 1987 of an automobile accident that happened in the Palestinian area that ended up with the Palestinians dying. And this was a sort of a rock throwing. This was led by Yasser Arafat, but it was more or less

grass roots, rioting with rock throwing and maybe the throwing of Molotov cocktails and such. And it ended up with some deaths, I think 1,000 Palestinian deaths and a couple of hundred Israeli deaths.

But the end result of the first endofota was the world began to look at, and the United States began to look at the Palestinians as maybe an occupied people, for which there was some legitimate claim that there needed to be a separate Palestinian state.

And so we end up with the Oslo Accords that settled the first Intifada situation, and which resulted in—and we can remember, I think, some of us, the time when Yasser Arafat came to D.C. and there was a signature on these accords in Washington, D.C. And there was, at that point, a developing consensus.

that the solution to the problem with the Palestinians was a two-state solution. There would be a Palestinian state that would be neighboring to but independent from Israel. And then we had the second endofada. The second endofada was a more violent circumstance. And it ended up with a more strident position by Israel.

And, as well, a notion that the United States was more firmly in the pocket of—well, not in the pocket of, but was more firmly allied with and would be supporting Israel quite aggressively. And, however, even with the second end of FATA, we end up with the notion that the settlement of this—

will be a two-state solution. The United States began to support Israel much more substantially with military funding under Obama. We funded their Iron Dome, which was a very expensive capital investment in their security. And, however, we opposed

their settlement of the West Bank and some of the other things which were viewed as destabilizing and moving the situation in the direction of destabilizing the relationship between Palestine and Israel in the direction of not being able to sustain a two-state solution. And then came Donald Trump. And Donald Trump immediately

sort of jumped with all fours in the direction of Israel with respect to the solution of the Palestine situation, and the movement of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, the working on the Abraham Accords, and, however, a clear reduction in the emphasis that a settlement would involve a Palestinian statehood. And at the same time, it was clear from Israeli policies

that they were not really in favor of at least Netanyahu and that wing of Israeli government, was not in favor of a two-state solution. And so, during the late 1990s, and then starting again in the 2000s, Israel began to work on dividing the Palestinians. Hamas

was essentially the entity that was in Gaza, and it was the entity representing the Palestinians in Gaza. But there was a completely independent entity representing the Palestinians in the West Bank. And it was clear that the government of Israel was interested in keeping that divide going. And so, for instance, in the decade of the 2010 to 2020,

In the late part of that decade, when Netanyahu was in power, he allowed the guitaries to fund Hamas, with so-called humanitarian funding, to the tune of about $1.5 billion. And there was a notion that Hamas was a hostile force.

But it was essentially a hostile force that Israel would mow the lawn of periodically, removing their capability of doing anything too difficult, too damaging to Israel, in exchange for this notion that the existence of Hamas

in Gaza made a two-state solution much less likely to occur. And then, of course, we have October 7, and that occurrence with the killing by Hamas of 13 or 1,500 Israelis in a terrible way, tilted the scale completely. And so, at that point,

the two-state solution became a very difficult outlook, and it became clear, at least from Israeli policy, that their policy is to make, I think it's pretty clear, to make Gaza uninhabitable. And I would guess that if someone is cynical about this, they're making the portions of Israel that Gazans occupy uninhabitable. You know, Sandy, you painted...

Uh, the historical picture of why, um, this, this hatred, um, and distrust between Israelis and not only the Palestinians, but, you know, the Lebanese and Iran and, and all of those, uh, countries.

have this, this angst against Israel. And, you know, this, this is today in CNN, the Israeli security cabinet secretly approved the legalization of over, and this is today's news over 30 new settle, settler outposts and farms and the occupied West bank last month, according to three Israeli sources, familiar with the decision.

Unlike similar decisions in the past, the approval was not publicly announced and by Israeli defense minister and finance ministers who did not respond to CNN request for comment. Two of the sources told CNN the approval was kept quiet to avoid international criticism against the backdrop of struggling settler violence towards Palestinians in the West Bank since the outset.

of the Iran war. So as we speak, Israel is moving settlements into areas that were considered off, you know, these things, the United States agreed to shouldn't be happening. These things are happening as we speak, the movement, and they're taking over.

And as long as those things are going on, Sandy, I don't know how they can think that there's going to be peace. And the reason that I think it's important, Sandy, to have you do a background on why is because we're talking about this ceasefire and clearly the ceasefire

I'm listening to—it's all over the place. I'm listening to the president say it doesn't include this. I'm listening to J.D. Vance say, oh, it does include this. They're not even on the same page on whether or not the continued bombing by Israel in Lebanon is a part of the settlement.

Well, I think what the United States is finding out is that their alliance with Israel is a bit like holding the tiger by the tail. And Israel has a very strong agenda in its own mind of what it wants to accomplish during this particular period, where we have weakened Iran, and we've probably weakened Iran's capacity to support Hamas and Hezbollah.

both of whom rely substantially on Iranian funding and Iranian supplies for their capacity to oppose Israel. But, you know, we should look at some more history. The United States essentially allowed Israel to become a nuclear power. So, of all the countries in the Middle East, the Israelis are the only ones known, at least at this time, to hold the nuclear weapon. It was developed in the 1960s at the demonary.

actor in Israel. It was developed with the support, undoubtedly, of the French, even though this was a time when nonproliferation was the policy of the world.

The French supported the development by Israel of nuclear capacity, presumably to produce electricity. But at the same time, the United States had a situation in Pennsylvania where there was highly enriched uranium, so-called the NUMEC affair, and they lost and had unaccounted for a substantial quantity of enriched uranium, which

continues to be the suspicion of those who investigate this, that it was the Israelis who got a hold of this enriched uranium, and with that enriched uranium and with other kinds of...

direct or indirect support they received from the West. They were able to develop nuclear power, which gives them a strong deterrent force in the Middle East. Presumably, one of the reasons people are so concerned about Iran getting a nuclear weapon is it would put Iran on parity with Israel, and Israel would lose its

hegemonic control of the Middle East with respect to at least nuclear power. But it's also clear that Israel has learned over the period of time, I guess, that what they really need and want is a bigger buffer, a bigger geography for Israel, control either direct or indirect of the space neighboring Israel in such a manner that they have greater safety. And so, clearly, that's

One of the reasons why their intent now on moving towards Lebanon, it's the reason why they took land when they did during the period where they were seizing land from Jordan.

It's clearly a factor with respect to their very almost hysterical concern about Iran developing nuclear power, because it would take the Trump card away from them with respect to power in the Middle East. And apparently, the United States maybe shares that. Our experience in history with Iran is much more complicated and belies the notion

that Iran is a natural enemy of ours, number one, that also our conduct, even after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, our conduct and our capacity to have dealings with Iran has varied. And we have had dealings with Iran during the same—during the period when they were controlled by Ayatollah, and when they had the Iranian Revolutionary Guard as their main power authority. And we did—

negotiate with them. There was a two-year period, 1998 to 2000, where the Ayatollah wanted to have conversations, he said, between the civilizations. Madeleine Albright had direct negotiations. She, at that point, confirmed and admitted that the United States had, in 1953, along with the British,

staged, essentially, the coup that got rid of Mohamed Mosaddegh, the democratically elected head of Iran, and installed the Shah. And the United States' interest in Iran really developed during World War II, when they realized that, number one, the Soviet Union might be the next danger or the next opponent that they needed to worry about. Iran neighbors Russia.

And at the end of World War II, when it came time for things to kind of move around in the mid-east and settle out after the war and after the complete collapse of the Ottoman Empire,

The Soviet Union was slow in moving back from Iran, the occupation particularly of the Azurbanian region of Iran, and the United States became alert to this and was interested. This was at a time when the Palavi family were the monarchs of Iran. They had a democratic reorganization of the government of Iran. You'd think the United States would be jubilant about that.

And Mohammed Mossadegh was elected in the early 1950s. And instead of Babalihoo for that, Mossadegh's interest in nationalizing the Iranian oil industry, which was the Anglo-Iranian oil industry, he was going to—and did nationalize it. And the response to that nationalization was the coup staged by the British and American intelligence to install the Shah. The Shah—

was a strong ally at the United States. Well, he was actually essentially a tool of the United States. We armed Iran to the hilt. We helped them develop a nuclear industry for the purpose of generating electricity, nuclear capacity. But it was that assistance by the United States during the period of the Shah, which is the seed for the nuclear capacity that Iran currently has.

The Shah ran a police state, and after 26 years in power, the people of Iran staged this Islamist revolution in 1979 that resulted in the unseating of the Shah and the installation of the Ayatollah. And here we are. But after the installation of the Ayatollah, the United States jumped in bed with a very strange ally. They jumped in bed with Saddam Hussein because

Iraq and Iran went to war with one another, and it was a a million damaging war. Yeah, a million people died. A million people killed in the war. And we armed Saddam Hussein. We gave him U.S. weaponry and dual use weaponry. We gave him lots of money. And the whole reason was we were favoring

him and Iraq against Iran, because we wanted to defame Iran, because Iran, immediately upon the installation of the Ayatollah, began to recognize that the United States, what it had done.

to Iran. And then when we sided with Iraq, we actually became the devil, because we were allowing and facilitating this war that killed in excess of 500,000 Iranians. And more Iranians died than Iraqis. One of the reasons being that Saddam Hussein and Iraq used gas. They committed war crimes, killing many Iranians through the use of gas. So

We basically laid the foundation for a fundamental distrust of the United States by Iran through our siding with Iraq. And, of course, we facilitated the power of Saddam Hussein, which we found necessary to turn around and destroy in 2003.

It's been a very complicated history. And as I said, in 1998, we were negotiating with Iran, trying to work out some detente. And then during the period of Barack Obama, after we had imposed sanctions, during the 90s, the United States began to adopt economic sanctions as its primary tool instead of warfare to try and

put leverage on the countries that it was trying to influence. And so we imposed many sanctions on Iran. And the negotiation that was carried out by Barack Obama was carried out in the form of, we will lift sanctions, if you will, for instance, restrict your capacity to develop nuclear weapons, which the agreement was adapted. It was a comprehensive

plan, the Joint Comprehensive Plan, in the form of a treaty, which, in 2016, the international atomic energy folks, the agency that inspects atomic energy around the world, was one of the enforcement mechanisms. Iran was apparently abiding.

by the agreement, according to the inspections. And so we lifted sanctions. And Israel, however, became very concerned about whether that agreement would still permit Iran to get so close to the capacity to build nuclear weapons. And so it was the Israeli lobby, really, that

created a great deal of pressure and negative energy about the treaty that had been signed by under the Obama administration. And, you know, as soon as Donald Trump got into power in 2016, that treaty was torn up. And here we are. You know, Sandy, all the things that you've just talked about.

are absolutely true and accurate. And you can find that information, it is there, right? It's not hidden. This is out there for anybody who wants to dig in and they'll find that. And so the more you, once you realize this winding web of deceit that has been going on, especially

when we when we hear uh president trump say well obama gave them all of this money when they froze the assets of iran those assets have been frozen all the time we had uh assets of iran in our banks and they were frozen they didn't have access part of the carrot to be able to work out

What was the Camp David Accords or whatever it was called? I don't know. No, it was called the JPCO. It was a joint comprehensive group, JCPO. Yeah, but Sandy, so when they were able to work that out, part of the deal was we're going to release your assets that we didn't give them any, that was their assets. And so that was the carrot that made them agree.

to this deal. Interestingly, the situation we're now in, when we ultimately have a settlement or a truce, there will have to be an agreement. We are saying there has to be an agreement that you will not develop nuclear weapons.

What is the way that you can confirm that nuclear weapons are not being developed? Well, it's inspections. And it's inspections by someone expert enough and neutral enough to be credible to the parties on both sides. And that's what we got in that agreement that was signed in the Obama administration, was that was the form of inspection for confirmation.

And the fact is that the ability to forge an agreement that is substantially better than the one that was forged is very, very limited. And it appears that what Israel wants is a physical proof that Iran is not capable.

of developing it by, number one, giving up all of their enriched uranium. Number two, I presume it would be by embargoing the capacity of Iran to import uranium that could be used for enrichment. Number three, I presume it's to eliminate all enrichment capability of all sorts, requiring that if they have nuclear power plants, they'd be supported entirely.

in some foreign manner. But the fact is that I'll be very surprised if a settlement of this current conflict looks very much different than the treaty that was torn up during the first Trump administration, which was the Iranian Nuclear Control Treaty.

But, you know, we have to remember that dealing with Iran and trying to get them to trust us in a negotiation is a difficult process given our history with Iran, given the history

that comes right up to the present, where we have participated now in obliterating, as the administration would say, large portions of the Iranian infrastructure and talking about eliminating their civilization. It's going to be a difficult process, one that's going to have to have intermediaries who are trusted by Iran for the purpose of reaching a peace. So, Sandy, I want to go back to...

because all of the things you said are important and I think the one thing especially is they were able, Donald Trump was able to do what's called a switcheroo in simplest terms because it was never a thought that Iran was

You know within weeks of being able to produce nuclear weapons to threaten America that was never that was never The case and yet they were able to spin it It because Israel was behind it saying that they're close to getting these nuclear weapons to

threatened Israel, not to really threaten America, but yet they were able to convince American people, some of the American people, that the threat was against us. Well, because delivering a nuclear weapon in the United States requires, one, having a nuclear weapon that is sufficiently small and capable, that can be missile launched. And then number two, you have to have a missile with a range that can get from

Iran to the United States. Now, you know, there are such missiles in existence, but there's absolutely no evidence that Iran is capable of having one or that they have bought any. Now, they do have allies that are capable of putting them in their hands. Russia and China both have such weapons. And so, you know,

The United States probably has to be careful about creating a circumstance that might justify, in their minds, the potential of putting that power in the hand of Iran. But, yeah, there's absolutely—I'm sure that an analysis of all of the intelligence data available to the United States would not be able to confirm that there was an imminent threat to the United States.

from Iran of nuclear weapons. And I think it's probably the case, based on what's leaked out, that there's absolutely no evidence that Iran actually was just days away from being able to create a nuclear weapon, period. Now, the problem is that—

When warfare or hostilities developed to a certain point, the truth goes out the window. It's the first casualty. And apparently that might be the case here. We were told less than 12 months ago that the nuclear capability of Iran had been destroyed entirely based on the bunker bombing and things that were done at that time. And then within 12 months,

The rationale for the much greater and more extensive attacks on Iran were the fact that the nuclear danger was imminent. So one or the other of those things wasn't true.

based on leaks from various intelligence sources. It's the second one that isn't true, which is that they were within days now of a capacity to use nuclear weapons. And so, the current administration making noises to say that all of the Middle East was on the verge of being obliterated by Iran with the use of nuclear weapons.

just I don't think will have any basis in fact whatsoever. Number two, their conduct of the war, since it has now started, suggests that they actually are relatively restrained. I mean, they have focused on a variety of targets, but it's basically based on the fact that this is a war of unequals. And the weaker power Iran is forced to use strategies that are

capable of creating leverage against their enemies. And so what are they doing? They're attacking some infrastructure sites within other countries, as well as closing the straits of Hormuz. But they aren't just generally attacking. In spite of what Israel might say, it appears that the that the drones sent out by Iran are focused on targets. You know, Sandy, you having

kind of given a history, part of the history of our hostilities between Iran and America. Having discussed all of that history and condensed it in the last 30 minutes or so, is it safe to say? Because I believe this is just my thought.

You can correct me if I'm wrong I Know that this thing had gotten completely out of control As far as I don't think Donald Trump ever expected it to Get to the point that it did You know 35 days or whatever it was and that all these other Middle Eastern nations would be impacted and affected and that

and that the canal would be blockaded. I don't think he had any idea that things were going to get to where they are now and the impact that it was going to have. And so he was looking for a way out. He used the rhetoric that he used because, you know, he certainly didn't know. When you get rid of all of the brain thrust, Sandy, that has

dealt with these kinds of things over the past 30 years. And you've gotten rid of all of those people who would know how to handle situations such as this, which is what Donald Trump and Pete Exeter did. They got rid of all those people. And now they got involved in a situation where the bombing was not going to be the end all.

And now they had nobody to try to figure out, Sandy, how are we going to get out of this? And more and more Donald Trump was seeing himself backed into a corner. He could talk about how great our weapons were. But I said all that to ask you. I think I don't care what the outcome is. I don't see us going back to war. I mean, I really don't think he's going to be able to...

push that button again after the ceasefire. I think much of our involvement in the Middle East has been the result of perceptions in domestic politics here in the United States. And I think that will be the case again this time. And I think it's been an unfortunate driver of our policies. It's pushed us in the direction, I think, of becoming

very closely aligned to Israel, to the point where instead of being able to possibly be a voice of restraint, which we were up through the 90s and into the early 2000s, and as well during the period of Barack Obama, where we were trying to at least restrain settlements and things that we thought would be destabilizing, domestic policy, I think, subsequent to that.

And certainly subsequent to October 7th in the last 12 months has created a very powerful kind of domestic political pressure towards supporting Israel. Now, I think what's going to happen now with respect to the continuation of this war with Iran will be completely dependent on whether Donald Trump can look at polls and believe that he is coming out of the polls.

based on the ceasefire and whatever comes out of the ceasefire in either politically neutral position or in a politically improved position. But if he thinks that the outcome in Iran is a severe detriment to his political posture, and by this I don't mean that the Republican Party's political posture. I mean the image of Donald Trump. If he thinks that the image of Donald Trump is going to be substantially damaged,

by abiding by the ceasefire and moving in the direction of taking a piece, whatever it is, and claiming victory. I think there is then a potential that we would go back to war, because I think this is all driven by a person who is totally fixated on legacy and image. And I think, therefore, that he's currently

selling the situation as a U.S. victory, and as therefore a victory for him, and an image-enhancing bit of international diplomacy. And if he can sustain that, or at least sustain a position that doesn't make this a negative, I think that you're right. I think we won't go back to war. But I think if it goes into a substantial negative position,

I think that it's harder to predict. So let me ask you, Sandy, when you look at even his Republican allies, many of them speaking out in opposition. Not the majority, because the majority of them are still with him. But many more Republicans are starting to speak out if the oil prices continue to skyrocket.

the Straits of Hormuz aren't reopened. I heard the presidents mention the other day about creating a pact with Iran and they can share the profits. These are the people you just got through trying to destroy. And he looks at everything and Sandy threw the lens of a deal. We've got to make a deal. Everything's not a deal, man.

Well, I think he realized, hey, this is a choke point. This is like a monopoly bridge. These straits are like a canal. And if we can control the canal and charge tolls, I mean, yeah, maybe we'll let Iran charge tolls. We'll just split it with them. And right now, Iran has gone to Oman, which is its neighbor across the strait. And Oman and Iran are apparently splitting tolls.

in some fashion, that are being charged for the passage of ships now. But what's happened is that, before the attacks by the United States on Iran, the Straits of Hormulans were open. The Ayatollah's administration was maybe under some attack by its populace.

The Ayatollah was very old and was going to be succeeded by somebody. There was going to be a potential for regime change. I mean, I think the sorry thing is—and the problem that Donald Trump might have is that it's going to be very hard to make the situation with Iran after this conflict better than—for at least the West—better for the West than the situation was before.

the assault on Iran, because it's now clear, I think, that Iran has a bargaining chip they didn't really have before, the Strait of Hormuz. They have a bargaining chip they didn't have before, because they've demonstrated to the mid-eastern countries, the Gulf states, that the Gulf states are vulnerable to Iran, not from nuclear power, but from drone attack, that the infrastructure of those countries is vulnerable, that the oil industry

in those countries is vulnerable, and they've learned that having U.S. military bases in their country is one of the things that makes them vulnerable. The U.S. military has not been able to protect these people from the attacks they've had, and the presence of those U.S. military bases has been one of the—has been the primary rationale for the attacks by Iran on these countries.

And furthermore, it's proving to the United States that it can be very expensive and risky for us to have bases in such places, because I don't think it's gotten a lot of publicity, but apparently the level of destruction by these drone attacks on the US military bases, some of them very big, very expensive, with very expensive assets in them, has been devastating. And so I think that's the problem.

That's actually residing in the Oval Office right now is when an analyst come out, when other countries evaluate this, and we've obviously created a lot of arms length.

countries in the world. We've got France, we've got England, we've got people who are strong allies who are going to be evaluating this outcome in probably very surgical and sterile ways, not bending over backwards to support the United States with respect to the way we would like to interpret it. You know, Sandy, you're kind of a star in and amongst other things.

So when we say we're gonna have JD Vance as our lead negotiator. Historically, we've had people in those positions who were our negotiators with background. I'm not saying JD Vance is not a smart guy, Sandy, but I'm talking about historically, we've had people

who could negotiate, who are skilled at that, are we running a risk to say, OK, we're going to put JD Vance—I mean, he's a novice when it comes to this kind of thing. Is it safe to say that? Well, luckily, he has the experience of Gerald Kushner and Mr. Lutnick to support him, knowing that, yes.

Typically, we've had either civilians who have made careers out of being involved in international diplomacy, who are involved as envoys in peace discussions. We've also had state department personnel with extreme experience in doing it. So, yeah, I mean, we definitely put ourselves at a disadvantage by not having people with a great deal of experience and expertise who are able to visualize

the future impacts of things that are being talked about in a manner that maybe requires the stuteness of a knowledge of international affairs and the widespread—I mean, I think one of the reasons we backed into the cactus we've backed into over the last eight to 10 years is this

unwillingness to rely upon experience and lessons learned in terms of forging new and different policies in the Middle East. We've kind of hooked our wagon to Mr. Netanyahu and his vision. We've also taken this transactional approach. And the problem with transactional approaches is they tend to be very short-term. So, you know, the notion of

Controlling the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for getting tolls doesn't take into account all kinds of collateral effects and impacts as well as the need to create a trajectory that would be different for the Mideast. So Sandy, I'm envisioning in these talks J.D. Vance coming from the perspective of

what President Trump wants. And that wasn't the best interest of America. The problem with what I see with the people who are representing this country, they're representing Donald Trump and Donald Trump and what's in his best interest and not in the best interests of our nation. How is it possible to overcome that as long as...

He's got lackeys who are going to see it through his prison. Well, the problem with the foreign affairs and the way our Constitution is designed is that the president is ultimately responsible for foreign affairs. Our Constitution presumes that a president will take the national interest and use the national interest as the basis for making the decisions in foreign affairs.

And that's where we run our luck here. It's not that these envoys are servants of the president, because in the way we run foreign affairs, that is the natural course of things. They report to the president. The buck stops with the president. The president makes the ultimate decisions. But it's presumed that he will listen to advisers.

that he will actually make his decisions based upon a premise that those decisions will be premised on the best interest of the United States as a nation. And while different parties and different ideologies could have a different view of what is in the national interest, I think the current concern by a vast number of people is that they're not certain.

that this president actually has the national interest well in mind, well enough in mind, to be able to make decisions which, while he would say he's couching them in the framework of doing them for the national interest, that the interest that he represents is so intuitionally his that it doesn't really reflect the national interest. You know, Sandy, as...

You know, we sit here and It's a white knuckler So to speak you just You don't feel comfortable That things are going to work out and and I think part of the reason Why me I'm speaking for myself. I don't feel comfortable That these things are going to work out

because of the guy that's sitting in the Oval Office. He's so temperamental. And he can't, I don't know if there's anybody sandy that he can confide in. As you stated many times before, five years ago when he was the guy in office, you know, there were people who could put the brakes on him. And well, listen, President Trump,

We've got to do this and we've got to do it that way. But it's no longer the case. Well, he's definitely tried to weed out in the process. And Project 2025 spelled out the processes for trying to make sure that loyalty to the elected official, the nationally elected official, was a primary purpose, a primary litmus test for those who would be brought into the administration.

And he's done that. And so, yes, we don't have many people who are probably going to expose him to contrary views. And then I think there are those, you know, the people who try and diagnose what's going on in the head of the president and why he does things. I mean,

He's demonstrably, actively involved for his family in developing wealth for his family, and not being shy about having the office of the president potentially facilitate that kind of growth and wealth.

And there are those who worry that the decision-making that relates to the interest of the nation might be unduly affected by a perception that what's, you know, there was a saying at one point, what's good for General Motors is good for the nation. I think there's a fear today that the decision-making might be based on a premise that what's good for Donald Trump is good for the nation. And I think that's at the heart of a lot of people's concern about how decision-making will be made.

just kind of watching his now he's attacking people who are once his allies. You know, Tucker Carlson in and many of the talking heads who really push for him to get reelected on their platforms. We're not talking about lightweight. We're talking about top podcasters who are conservative. He's attacking them for.

Well, Tucker Carlson, of course, decided that he wasn't any longer in agreement with Donald Trump, and he primarily split with him on foreign policy, much the same way that I think Vice President Vance privately probably has misgivings about what's going on internationally. But, yeah, I mean, I think that's how

You know, the conservative movement, the so-called MAGA movement as that portion of the conservative movement has been labeled, I think has conserved up a difficult dessert.

with respect to this Iran conflict by the president, because it runs contrary to much of what they have talked about and much of what he talked about during the campaign, which was staying out of wars, particularly the mid-east. I mean, the conversation at the beginning of administration was, let's just get out of the mid-east altogether. Let's let them solve their problems and we'll focus on China. Well, there's certainly been a pivot from that in the last months.

And I guess the last thing I would add, Sandy, is while we're watching all of this, the amount of money that's been spent in this last 40 days or whatever it is, all of the weaponry that we've used has to be replaced. All of the expenses that are tied up in that,

are going to have to be again, money's got to come from somewhere. You always say there's a limited amount of dollars. So in order to replenish the war machine, it's got to come at the expense of the taxpayers. Taxpayers still aren't getting what they've been asking for. Is this a long term?

Is this long-term damage to the Republican Party as it relates to elections? Well, it's worse than that. I think it's long-term damage to the nation at large, because the solution to the size of the deficit that's currently being incurred, the solution to harnessing the defense budget in some fashion—I mean, moving it to $1.5 trillion is an outlandish number.

And it's outlandish when compared to the rest of our budget. It's outlandish when compared to the size of our deficit. And it's outlandish when compared to the size of the tax increase that would be needed to support it if we got a grip on deficit expenditures and decided that we had to face up to a financial reality of coming closer to balancing our budgets during periods of prosperity. And so

Yeah, it's a this is an extremely important point in history, and it's going to be important not just from the standpoint of foreign affairs. It's going to be important as a as a watermark associated with how the government handles itself and particularly how it handles itself financially. So last thing, historians are going to pick over the bones and and that the carcass.

has already left and the bones are the only thing that is left. And so the historians are going to talk about this time, Sandy, as a turning point in our nation, for democracy and for all sorts of things. Do you think that this is a turning point?

in the history of our nation? I do. And the question is whether the turning point by historians a century from now will look back at this and say this was the wake-up call that the country needed in order to get itself on the right path and basically we heave a sigh of thankful relief that it was that wake-up call or was this the turning point when the United States

really jumped the shark, as they used to say about TV shows that went off the trolley. Is this when the United States really jumped the shark? And this was what took us down the calamitous path that got us where we are now. Those are going to be the optional ways, I think, that historians will look at it. I hope it's the former and not the latter. All right, my friend, always great to have any conversation with you this one.

More in depth and I'll tell you, I can't wait to hear it played back covered a lot of territory. Thank you as always, my friend. Have a great weekend and I'll see you next time. All right, that's a wrap for what's going on with Earl Ingram. See you guys later.